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‘If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here’1  
 
A Comment on Civic Capitalism: introducing a new model of capitalism, by 
 Colin Hay & Tony Payne, 2013. 
 
Ian Gough 
 
 
Civic Capitalism (CC) is the latest of several alternative left-of-centre strategies to 
explain, cope with and move beyond the present crisis state of capitalism. Since 
the financial crisis these have included the Green New Deal (2008), Plan B 
(2011), the CRESC perspective (Engelen et al 2011) and the Kilburn Manifesto 
(2104), and among others. Of course there have been earlier diagnoses and 
alternatives; Civic Capitalism reminds me of David Marquand’s The Unprincipled 
Society (1988).  
 
Despite significant differences and disagreements, there is a remarkable degree 
of consensus on several dimensions including at least the following: 
 The ‘economy’ should be re-embedded in broader society 
 The state should play a leading role in this process 
 Egregious inequality must be directly addressed 
 The financialisation of capital must be curbed and regulated 
 Productive and reproductive investment should be expanded 
 Sustainability should form a core goal for economic and social policy 
 New indicators of wellbeing are urged to replace GDP 
 New forms of democracy and politics need fostering 
 All of which requires an alternative moral dimension to that of neo-
liberalism. 
 
There is less consensus on some other aspects.  
 Is the goal to moderate capitalism (to aim for ‘capitalism with an 
adjective’) or to recognise and transit beyond its systemic limits? Civic 
Capitalism is quite explicit here: ‘making capitalism work for us is... both 
possible and desirable’.  
 How are climate change and environmental threats integrated into the 
accounts? CC addresses this in some detail. 
 To what extent is the role of gendered, unwaged labour and social 
reproduction recognised as both a critical economic feature and a distinct 
normative perspective (Fraser 2014)? CC is silent here. 
 What are the class and social movements which might challenge neo-
liberalism? CC is silent here.  
 Is the strategy aimed at the UK (thus recognising the peculiarities of 
British capitalism), the EU, the OECD world, or indeed the globe 
(requiring some recognition that the centre of gravity is shifting to Asia 
and that in many parts of the world capitalism shows no signs of crisis)? 
                                                        
1 Apocryphal reply of Irishman when asked the way to Dublin 
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Though written from a UK perspective, CC recognises and briefly 
addresses some European and global issues. 
 
In this brief reply I will concentrate on three issues only. First, how can these 
strategies for coping with capitalist crisis be linked with those required to avert 
the fast-looming environmental crisis? Second, if slower growth or zero growth 
is required to achieve environmental sustainability, what does this portend for 
economic and political strategy? Third, has the neo-liberal revolution gone too 
far, blocking any conceivable social forces that could reverse direction (the ‘I 
wouldn’t start from here’ problem)? 
 
 
The environmental crisis  
 
To achieve a fifty-fifty chance of avoiding global warming exceeding 2℃ by the 
end of the century, and taking population growth into account, global emissions 
must be cut from around 7 tonnes CO2e per person per year now to no more 
than 2 by 2050 – a revolutionary downshift of 3.5 times. But if output per person 
continues to grow at its present rate (roughly trebling by 2050), then global 
emissions per unit of output must fall by a factor of 9-10 by 2050 – now only 34 
years away. (And remember a 50-50 chance is like playing Russian roulette with 
bullets in three chambers).  
 
The dominant strategy for achieving this within a capitalist global order goes by 
various labels including ‘ecological modernisation’, ‘green growth’ and a ‘new 
industrial revolution’. (‘Sustainable development’ is somewhat different because 
development does not necessarily entail growth). CC endorses this approach and 
provides data and argument showing the unsustainability of the contemporary 
economic model.  
 
There are three broad mechanisms which can conceivably achieve this 
revolution. The first, and the most amenable to those neo-liberal ideologists who 
accept the climate science (many do not), is to price carbon so as to impose costs 
on polluters and thus internalise the externalities they generate, and provide 
price incentives for sustainable energy. Though this will have a role to play, it is 
by now clear that it cannot be anywhere near sufficient (and it would have 
regressive distributive effects to add to the ballooning inequality of past 
decades). The second alternative, advocated by Lord Stern among others, is to 
foster a transformative technological/ industrial revolution to decarbonise 
almost all energy by 2050. The third is to shift the behaviours of consumers in 
order drastically to save energy and switch to low-carbon consumption.  
 
What is evident is that all three policy responses are required (Grubb et al 2014). 
Moreover, the state must play a big role in all three: setting energy and other 
prices via taxation and subsidies; regulating standards across a wide spectrum of 
economic activities; undertaking strategic planning; developing national 
investment frameworks covering energy, transport, housing and urban forms, 
electronic networks, climate adaptation and eco-system maintenance (and not 
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forgetting the whole range of social investment in health, education, training 
etc); the list goes on.  
 
CC adumbrates such a neo-Keynesian strategy of ‘sustainable development 
through investment’; the idea of the state as ‘collective goods provider of last 
resort’ summarises this well. CC also joins a chorus of voices advocating an 
alternative measure of progress to GDP - in this case a Sustainable Economic 
Development index. The proposal to create a hybrid GDP-SED index with the 
weights gradually shifting from the former to the latter over, say, 20 years is 
original and important.  
 
The growth issue 
 
However, CC is adamant that all this does not mean that abandonment of the 
search for growth – ‘quite the contrary’. It is useful to distinguish two 
perspectives here. 
 
First, it is highly likely that growth, especially in Europe, will be slower over the 
next three decades than over the last three, for several reasons: demographic 
shifts, notable population ageing; the continued, if slower, expansion of the 
services sector with low or zero productivity growth; rising inequality which 
stunts demand; and the huge overhang of personal debt. If big carbon mitigation 
programmes are factored in, then a recent model predicts a further fall in growth 
rates over the next two decades, as carbon pricing drives up production costs 
and slows down increases in purchasing power (IDDRI 2014). Even if driven by a 
new green industrial revolution, we should not assume a growth rate in the West 
of 2%pa as in the past – perhaps 1%pa is more likely. This has negative 
implications for inequality, as Piketty (2014) shows, and for social justice. The 
post-war welfare state was built on a post-war growth state; its ending would 
pose radical new issues. 
 
But second, the argument of ecological economists such as Tim Jackson (2009) is 
that we cannot grow forever - or indeed, in the rich North, from now on. The 
argument often advanced that a ‘weightless’, creative, caring, service-based 
economy can tread with a light ecological footprint ignores the fact that creative 
and caring workers will also want to consume a wide range of material goods 
(Jackson 2009). The hidden assumption is that the UK will continue to import 
many consumer goods and thus export their emissions. So we must find a 
progressive way to harmonise slower/stationary growth with both rising 
wellbeing and responsible husbandry of the planet. At this point, the strategy of 
sustainable development through investment is insufficient. In my view, the 
following strategies and policies then need to play a central role. 
 
First, a strategy for consumption should prioritise need-satisfiers over want-
satisfiers, non-material satisfiers over material satisfiers, and low-carbon 
satisfiers over carbon-intensive satisfiers. (Satisfiers include both goods and 
services, but also activities and relationships).  There are various ways of doing 
this but all mean challenging the enthronement of ‘consumer sovereignty’, which 
is very often big-producer and ad-agency sovereignty (Gough 2014). This could 
 4 
be done via taxation of high-carbon luxuries, the public provision of basic need 
satisfiers, like energy and water, and a form of carbon allowances and trading, 
with two separate currencies – money and carbon – for a range of items 
including domestic energy, petrol and air travel.  
 
Second, a strategy for production could include moving to a shorter working 
week. Assuming economy-wide productivity continues to rise (if not at past 
rates), this amounts to taking more of these gains in the form of rising ‘leisure’ 
rather than consumption. Since 1975, when they had similar hours of work, the 
US has reduced average hours by 4% and Germany by 22% (Schor 2012). All 
other things being equal, Germany has deployed its productivity dividend in a 
less environmentally harmful way than the United States.  Several European 
countries have initiated experiments in reducing work time which offer 
constructive lessons, but the current grain of UK and EU social policy - the social 
investment state - is the complete opposite: getting more people into work and 
into full-time work and fetishising ‘hard-working families’.  
 
Third, a new strategy for the welfare state would be needed to cope with some 
side-effects of environmental programmes as well as to build capacities, meet 
unmet needs and tackle egregious inequality. This certainly means building an 
alternative to ‘austerity’ as a macro-policy, but it requires more: a new emphasis 
on prevention as the social policy approach of first choice and building on the 
uncommodified household and civic economies to establish a default strategy of 
‘co-production’ in the welfare services. These measures would complement the 
necessary taxation and redistribution of wealth and unearned incomes.  
 
Finally, an emphasis on localism would be a new priority in the most centralised 
nation in the developed world – the UK. This would need to extend to finance, 
planning and investment as well as social policy. But, more radically, it would 
support the ‘foundational economy’ – that part of the private sector producing a 
range of necessities – telecoms, supermarkets, retail banks – which is also 
relatively sheltered from foreign competition (Bowman et al 2014). Such a 
localist strategy would begin to cut down on food miles and other carbon-
extravagant practices as well as reducing exposure to trade shocks.  
 
None of these proposals - apart from the fourth to a limited extent – figure in 
Civic Capitalism or in most alternative strategies. I would want to see these 
worked into a transitional strategy for eco-social policy, starting from an 
assumption of low economic growth and working up to a scenario of deliberately 
limited growth. 
 
The strange non-death of neo-liberalism 
 
But this brings us back to where we are now, summarised in the title of Crouch’s 
book (2011). Both a sustainable growth economy and a sustainable zero-growth 
economy would require extensive state intervention. Yet to advocate such an 
expanded role for the state without addressing the deep embeddedness of neo-
liberal capitalism is misleading. Finance capital pursues the shortest of short-
term advantage; powerful corporate and financial actors lobby governments and 
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subvert democratic demands; the capacities of states have been denuded over 
three decades and their dependence on debt and bond markets extended. In 
short, we must evaluate economic policies, such as those we are addressing, in 
full knowledge of the world in which we operate. This induces great pessimism 
that the near-decarbonisation of global energy systems can remotely be achieved 
– let alone within 34 years.  
 
Yet capitalism cannot exist in a free-floating form; it requires countervailing 
social institutions to moderate its worst excesses. This has been argued from 
different theoretical directions. Marxist: the absolute exploitation of labourers 
and the degraded reproduction of labour power, countered with the campaign 
for the 10 hour working day and numerous subsequent state welfare policies 
(Gough 1979). Polanyian: the excessive commodification of the fictitious 
commodities of Labour, Land and Money fosters a triple crisis (Streeck 2014). 
Feminist: the labour process is founded on the social reproduction activities of 
women and families (Fraser 2014). 
 
All this is well known, and was enshrined in the mixed economies and welfare 
states of the post-war - and the Cold War - period that marked the heyday of 
democratic capitalism. But functionality does not drive countervailing action; 
collective agency is necessary. Over the last three decades the pursuit of 
‘legitimate greed’ by capital owners has reversed these gains and brought about 
the problems which these strategies intend to address. The problem is, as 
Streeck is the latest to argue, that the neo-liberal economic order has gradually 
weakened all democratic constraints on the economy. Partly this has been due to 
the emasculation of trades unions and ‘democratic class struggle’ and its 
replacement with ‘market-conforming democracy’. Partly to the 
commodification and marketization of almost all the myriad social institutions 
that previously constrained the pursuit of profit.  
 
In Streeck’s (2014) words, the Staatsvolk of citizens has been disempowered and 
the Marktvolk of bondholders now rule states. This feeds into citizen apathy and 
a further weakening of alternatives to the status quo. Thus all the normal 
restraints over capitalist greed have been removed or weakened. That only 
leaves ‘far-sighted elites’ (such as, for example, Adair Turner in the UK), but in a 
final twist these elites gradually become globalised and delinked from the 
interests of any particular nation state.  
 
This is the economic-social-political order that is now called on to tackle the 
urgent and egregious challenge of climate change and pursue the twin goals of 
planetary sustainability and human wellbeing. ‘If I were you, I wouldn’t start 
from here’.  
 
 
Ian Gough, September 2014 
 
Many thanks to Anna Coote and Graham Room for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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